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State, Dep’t of Taxation v. Masco Builder, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. 66 (October 20, 2011)1 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW—TAXATION 
 
Summary 
 
An appeal from a district court order granting a petition for judicial review in a tax matter. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 The Court found that the Nevada Tax Commission improperly substituted its judgment 
for that of the administrative law judge, whose determination was based on substantial evidence. 
The Court also found that, because the only bar to filing a timely refund claim was a procedural 
technicality, equity warranted a tolling of the statute of limitations. Thus, the Court affirmed the 
district court’s decision to grant the taxpayer’s petition for judicial review and the taxpayer’s 
entire refund request. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
   
 Masco Builder Cabinet Group (“Masco”) is a cabinet-manufacturing company that sells 
its cabinets in retail showrooms and installs them in houses.  Under Nevada’s tax code, Masco 
had to remit sales tax to the Nevada Department of Taxation (“Tax Department”) for each retail 
sale it made, and remit a use tax for each construction contract it entered into.2  Sales tax is 
calculated as percentage of the retail price while use tax is calculated as a percentage of the cost 
to acquire the cabinet components.3  Masco acquired Root Industries (“Root”) in 2003, and 
retained Root’s personnel, based in Reno, to handle Masco’s northern Nevada business. Root 
kept the same computer system and accounting program it used under its prior ownership. This 
program automatically added “sales tax” on every invoice sent to a customer, including ones for 
contract sales. 
 
 Masco’s construction contracts were structured differently than its retail contracts. Under 
its construction contracts, customers would pay a lump sum to Masco, and Masco would be 
responsible for paying any taxes. To ensure that the proper tax was paid, Masco had to calculate 
the tax into its lump price. Instead of applying the use tax, Masco would enter the price into its 
accounting system as the lump sum minus the sales tax and then remit the remainder to the 
Department of Taxation as “sales tax.” 
  
 In 2006, the Tax Department audited Masco and discovered that Masco had been 
remitting a “sales tax” for its contract work when it should have been remitting a “use tax.”  The 
monetary difference between the two was substantial.  Both the auditor and Masco preliminarily 
agreed that Masco was entitled to a refund and the auditor said he would consider the potential 
refund within the context of the audit.  
 
                                            
1 By Rami Hernandez. 
2 NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 372.105, 372.185 (2007); NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 372.200 (1) (2008). 
3 Id. 
Under Nevada law, a taxpayer must file a formal refund claim within three years of when 
the purported overpayment occurred.4 Additionally,  the Tax Department is only allowed to 
collect for underpayments that occurred within three years of when the deficiency is made.5  
Because the audit would be lengthy, the Tax Department requested that Masco sign a waiver of 
the statute of limitations. This waiver would allow the Tax Department to collect on a past 
deficiency.  Masco was under the understanding that it could collect for any overpayments as 
well.  Upon this understanding, Masco did not file a formal refund claim until after the audit had 
concluded. 
 
 Per department policy, Tax Department waiver forms only extended the statute of 
limitations for three months at a time.  As a result, Masco signed several waivers between mid-
2006 and mid-2007.  By 2007, the audit had been completed, but the auditor who performed it 
left the Tax Department without notifying or informing Masco that the audit had finished.  
Masco realized that the most recent waiver was about to expire and contacted the Tax 
Department to get the waiver extended, but its calls were not returned. Eventually, Masco spoke 
to the new auditor, but the last waiver had already expired. The new auditor told Masco that the 
Tax Department was denying its refund request. 
 
 Two months later, Masco received the Tax Department’s deficiency request, which made 
no mention of the refund request or why it was denied.  Masco filed a formal refund claim in 
January 2008 as part of a petition for redetermination.  At a hearing before an Administrative 
Law Judge (“ALJ”), the Tax Department maintained that Masco was not entitled to a refund 
because it had been acting as retail seller under the contracts in question and that even if entitled 
to a refund, any overpayments three years prior to January 2008 were time-barred. 
 
 The ALJ disagreed with the Tax Department, finding that Masco’s contracts were 
construction contracts and Masco was entitled to a refund on the overpaid sales tax.  The ALJ 
also determined that Masco relied on the auditor’s representation that he would consider Masco’s 
refund request within the context of the audit. 
 
 The Tax Department appealed the ALJ’s determinations to the Tax Commission.  After a 
hearing, the Tax Commission reversed the ALJ’s determination that Masco was entitled to a 
refund.  It also found, without addressing Masco’s reliance on the auditor, that Masco’s failure to 
timely file a refund claim would render a portion of its refund request time-barred. 
 
 Masco filed a petition for judicial review.  The district court granted Masco’s petition on 
the basis that the Tax Commission has improperly substituted its judgment for the ALJ’s.  The 
court reinstated the ALJ’s original determination that Masco was entitled to a refund and that the 
refund should cover the entire audit period.  The Tax Department appealed. 
 
Discussion 
 
The three-justice panel wrote its unanimous opinion per curiam. The Tax Department 
made two arguments at the appeals hearing. First, the Tax Commission acted properly because 
                                            
4 NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 372.635(1), 372.650 (2007). 
5 NEV. REV. STAT. § 372.355(1) (2007). 
the ALJ’s determination was clearly erroneous. Second, even if Masco is entitled to a tax refund, 
it should be limited to three years prior to its filing for a claim in January 2008 per the statute of 
limitations. 
 
Based on the substantial evidence in the record, the Supreme Court found that the ALJ’s 
determination that Masco was entitled to a refund was not clearly erroneous.  The Court also 
found that under the “doctrine of equitable tolling,” the applicable statute of limitations tolled 
from the moment Masco signed the Tax Department’s first waiver in June 2006 with the 
understanding that its refund request would be considered in the context of the audit. 
 
 The standard of review the Court uses for reviewing an administrative agency’s decision 
is the same as that of a district court.6  Legal questions are reviewed de novo and factual 
questions are limited to whether the agency’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.7  
The same standard as the Supreme Court’s analysis governed the Tax Commission’s review of 
the ALJ’s finding.8   
 
Because the Tax Commission’s finding was based on substantial evidence, it improperly 
substituted its own judgment for that of the ALJ.  The Tax Department argued that the invoices 
from Root prove that Masco intended its construction contracts to be retail contracts.  Masco 
disagreed, providing language from its original contracts showing they were more akin to 
construction contracts than retail contracts.  Based on this evidence, the ALJ found that the 
construction contracts’ inclusion of lump sums demonstrate the contracts were construction 
contracts and not retail contracts.  The invoices produced by Root, including the sales tax line, 
were merely clerical instruments not indicative of the contract’s intentions.  The Tax Department 
did not address the ALJ’s evidentiary findings, nor why the invoices reflect Masco’s choice to 
act as a retail seller. The Court therefore affirmed the district court’s determination to reinstate 
the ALJ’s determination that Masco is entitled to a refund. 
 
 Concerning the question of the statutory period, the Court applied the doctrine of 
equitable tolling, which suspends the running of a statute of limitations when the only bar to a 
timely filed claim is a procedural technicality.9  Here, the Court found that the only basis for the 
Tax Department’s argument was a procedural technicality.  Masco’s only shortcoming was that it 
did not send the Tax Department its refund request after telling the original tax auditor that it 
would be requesting one.  The Tax Department knew of Masco’s basis for its refund request for 
the beginning of the audit and had investigated the matter.  Thus, there was no danger of 
prejudice to the Tax Department.  Finally, the Court found that the interests of justice require the 
suspension of the statute of limitations.  Using a factors test found in case law,10 the Court found 
that Masco attempted to contact the Tax Department and was ignored.  Effectively, the Tax 
Department lulled Masco into a “false sense of security” and then changed its mind because it 
was no longer convenient or financially beneficial. 
                                            
6 Garcia v. Scolari’s Food & Drug, 125 Nev. 48, 56, 200 P.3d 514, 519-20 (2009) 
7 Id. 
8 NEV. REV. STAT. § 360.390(2) (2007). 
9 Copeland v. Desert Inn Hotel, 99 Nev. 823, 826, 673 P.2d 490, 492 (1983); Lantzy v. Centex Homes, 73 P.3d 517, 
523 (Cal 2003); Seino v. Emp’r Ins. Co. of Nev., 121 Nev. 146, 152, 111 P.3d 1107, 1112 (2005). 
10 Copeland, 99 Nev. at 826, 673 P.2d at 492. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 An Administrative Law Judge’s decision is subject to the same review as a court’s 
decision and factual decisions are limited to whether the agency’s decision is supported by 
substantial evidence. Additionally, the statute of limitations is suspended under the doctrine of 
equitable tolling when the only bar to filing a timely claim is a procedural technicality.  
